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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, a core-peripheral beliefs framework is used to present a structure for conceptualising 
epistemological beliefs, or beliefs about the nature and acquisition of knowledge. Using this framework, 
the structure of the epistemological belief system is seen as comprising both core beliefs about knowing 
and peripheral beliefs about learning. Core beliefs about knowing are central and connected to most 
other beliefs whereas peripheral beliefs about learning and teaching are derived from these core beliefs 
and are more easily reflected upon and changed. The two distinct literatures related to developmental 
epistemological beliefs and student learning research are therefore integrated and discussed in this paper 
to provide a theoretical basis for future studies.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
Epistemological beliefs 
 
Facilitating meaningful learning in tertiary education contexts has been the focus of many research 
endeavours, particularly within the body of literature concerning student learning.  Over the last thirty 
years, many researchers have noted the relationship between students’ conceptions of learning and the 
learning approaches subsequently taken.  For example, in the 1970s Marton and Säljö (1976) found 
that if students used surface-level processing such as rote memorising the text, students viewed 
learning, in that context, as reproductive. Such reproductive beliefs fostered little reflection on the 
process of learning. However, when students saw learning as being related to a process of making 
meaning they were more likely to engage in deep approaches to learning and construct well-organised 
concepts.  
 
A substantial body of research is now indicating that teacher educators may also need to focus on 
a related, but somewhat different set of beliefs in order to facilitate learning for meaning. These 
are called epistemological beliefs and concern the views individuals have about the nature and 
acquisition of knowledge (Bendixen, Dunkle & Schraw, 1994). This paper is an overview of the 
literature related to epistemological beliefs and student learning. Based on this, a framework for 
considering perspectives of knowing and learning as an holistic set of epistemological beliefs is 
presented. Teaching implications will also be considered. 
 
Personal epistemological beliefs range from naïve, dualistic beliefs in the existence of absolute truths 
to sophisticated, relativistic beliefs that knowledge is tentative, personal and relative to various 
contexts. Throughout the current study the term naïve will be used to refer to individuals who have a 
tendency to believe that truth is certain, absolute and able to be transferred by an authority. The use of 
the term sophisticated will refer to those beliefs that truth is relative, changing, and actively 
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constructed by the individual. This terminology is commonly used in the epistemological beliefs 
literature (Kardash & Scholes, 1996). 
 
 
Changes in epistemological beliefs are considered to take place when students are challenged to 
rethink or reconstruct such beliefs into more mature ways of knowing (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). There 
is evidence to suggest that education influences such epistemological development (Alexander & 
Dochy, 1995; Perry, 1981; Strange & King, 1981; King & Kitchener, 1994; Schommer, 1998b) where 
tertiary studies are likely to provide exposure to a variety of educational perspectives. For example, in 
Alexander and Dochy’s (1995) cross-cultural study, American participants who had developed 
knowing and learning expertise through further education were more able to see multiple perspectives 
and offer tentative explanations when defending their perspectives of what constituted knowledge and 
beliefs. Effectively, exposure to further education may cause cognitive conflict that results in the 
reconstruction of simplistic epistemological beliefs into more relativistic, sophisticated ways of 
knowing. It is likely that, in addition to educational experiences, life experiences (Belenky et al., 
1986) and physical development may facilitate epistemological development although it is not clear 
exactly how each of these factors influences epistemological beliefs (Schommer, 1998). 
 
Hofer and Pintrich (1997) extensively reviewed the research related to epistemological beliefs. They 
described three major areas of research, which included investigations regarding how students 
interpret their learning experiences (see Belenky et al., 1986 and Perry, 1970); the influence of 
epistemological beliefs on reasoning (see King & Kitchener, 1994); and the notion of 
multidimensional rather than unidimensional beliefs (see Schommer, 1994). These areas will be used 
to structure this review of the epistemological beliefs literature.  
 
Epistemological Beliefs: How Students Interpret Learning Experiences 
 
Perry's Epistemological Positions  
 
One of the most influential researchers in the area of epistemological beliefs was William Perry. In his 
longitudinal research spanning the late 1950s and early 1960s, 84 male liberal arts students were 
asked to describe their university experiences. Responses to open-ended interview questions were 
considered at first to be the result of certain personality characteristics but each year, as Perry and his 
colleagues reinterviewed the students, they discovered that a consistent pattern of change was 
emerging with respect to how the students viewed the world (Perry, 1988). These patterns of change 
were related to the cognitive (thinking), identity and ethical (care) development of students and were 
assumed to account for experiences both within, and external to, the university context. 
 
Perry’s description of development was represented by positions along a "pilgrim's path" (Perry, 
1988). He described changes in thinking as a type of evolution in the way individuals interpret their 
world. According to Perry, there were four main epistemological positions: Dualism, Multiplism, 
Relativism and Commitment.  Individuals who held dualistic views about the nature of knowledge 
believed that absolute truths (right/wrong) exist and could be transmitted to an individual from an 
authority or expert. Next, when individuals began to conceive of knowledge in a multiplistic way, 
they conceded that as well as absolute truths, there were some things that could not be known with 
any certainty. Such individuals believed that knowledge comprised both personal opinions and 
ultimate truths. They relied less on authorities for absolute truths, and personal opinions and truths 
were still considered to be “right” or “wrong”.  The next position, Relativism, constituted a major 
shift in epistemological thinking because individuals considered that knowledge was actively and 
personally constructed, although initially this may have occurred in some contexts only. Absolute 
truths could no longer exist because truth was considered to be relative to individuals’ personal 
interpretations of experiences. In the final positions related to commitment, relativistic thinking was 
BELIEFS ABOUT KNOWING AND LEARNING – BROWNLEE ET AL 
 
 
3 
 
still a feature, but particular beliefs were more valued than others and were committed to in a flexible 
manner.  
 
These epistemological beliefs were considered to influence learning. Schommer (1993a) and Ryan 
(1984a) reported that the more students conceived of knowing as dualistic, the more likely they were 
to gauge their understanding based on factual standards. Relativist thinkers, conversely, were more 
likely to consider that comprehension was related to understanding and application. Students with 
relativistic beliefs are more able to reflect on different ways of thinking rather than focussing only on 
content. The ability to compare different ways of thinking reflects "meta-thinking, the capacity to 
examine thought, including one's own" (Perry, 1981, p. 88). Such reflective capacity enables students 
to see other peoples' points of view. It also enables them to reflect on relationships so they can 
integrate information into relational wholes rather than maintaining isolated pieces of information.  
 
  Women’s Ways of Knowing 
 
Although Perry’s (1970) epistemological positions were not intended to focus on specific gender 
issues, the positions were derived using predominantly male Harvard university students. In 
subsequent research, these positions were often used to characterise female college students (Sottile, 
1994). In response to these gender issues, Belenky et al. (1986) described a sequence of 
epistemological development by interviewing 135 women from academic and non-academic 
backgrounds. They asked the women to respond to a number of open-ended questions that were 
intended to reflect moral, cognitive and identity development. They described five ways of knowing 
in the development of epistemological beliefs that closely aligned with those described by Perry 
(1970). The positions of Silence, Received Knowing, Subjective Knowing, Procedural Knowing, and 
Constructed Knowing emerged in Belenky et al.’s study of womens’ ways of knowing. Each will be 
discussed in turn. 
 
In the first position, Silence, individuals are likely to believe that knowledge is transmitted from an 
authority and that knowledge is absolute and categorical. Such women lacked the ability to engage in 
personal reflection. Recently, Goldberger (1996b) described how Silence, from some cultural 
perspectives, may represent an adaptive way of knowing. For example, if cultural mores dictate 
silence as a mark of respect, then such silence represents a different way of knowing to those silenced 
through oppression and poor relationships with significant authorities in their lives. In fact, 
Goldberger now prefers the term Silenced to indicate that this oppressed group of people are forced 
into voicelessness rather than choosing to remain silent. Perry (1970) did not find this type of beliefs 
about knowing in his male sample. 
 
In the second position, Received Knowing is conceived of as dualistic (categorical and absolute) and 
learning takes place through passively receiving knowledge. These women tend not to believe in their 
own ability, perceiving authorities as possessing all the answers. Goldberger (1996b) believed that 
received ways of knowing may not be naïve when cultural factors such as ‘deference to external 
authority’ (Goldberger, 1996b, p. 351) are taken into consideration. 
 
In the third position, Subjective Knowing, women believe that knowledge is subjective (an inner 
voice) and no longer rely on the power of authorities to know. According to Belenky et al. (1986), 
subjective knowledge is based on intuitive ways of knowing that are often described as ‘gut feelings’ 
and often considered typical of womens’ thinking. This position is similar to Perry’s (1970) 
description of multiplism, although Perry's position included both subjective and dualistic beliefs.   
 
In the next position, Procedural Knowing, individuals believe that knowing no longer relies on 
intuitive knowledge. Women in this position often use conscious systematic processes of thinking 
rather than relying only on content. This means that the use of such processes means individuals now 
have ways of interpreting the world: Content no longer offers an exact representation of the world that 
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can be transmitted and recalled. Truth is no longer considered absolute and is now open to 
interpretation (Belenky et al., 1986). Perry (1981) described this as relativism.  
 
The final position, Constructed Knowing involves the integration of both procedural and subjective, 
or rational and emotive knowledge. Women who evidenced Constructed Knowing are more able to 
deal with high levels of ambiguity and realise that contradiction and continual evaluation of beliefs 
about knowing are necessary. Such constructed ways of knowing do not clearly resemble any of 
Perry's (1970) positions.  
 
The Influence of Epistemological Beliefs on Reasoning 
 
King and Kitchener (1985, 1994) also investigated the influence of epistemological beliefs on 
learning. Emerging from Perry’s work, their Reflective Judgment Model is a description of changes in 
reflective processes and epistemological beliefs.  
 
Reflective judgment beliefs are considered to influence individuals’ decisions in ill-defined problem 
solving (Kitchener, 1983). That is, beliefs about knowing may determine the type of problem solving 
strategies used. King and Kitchener postulated three main types of reflective thinking in the reflective 
judgment model (King & Kitchener, 1985; King & Kitchener, 1994). These are pre-reflective, quasi-
reflective, and reflective thinking.  
 
Pre Reflective Thinking 
 
King and Kitchener (1994) believed that individuals are not able to think reflectively at this stage 
because truth is still considered to be absolute. Therefore, when dealing with ill-structured problems, 
solutions are dogmatically right or wrong and “beliefs are either unexamined and unjustified or 
justified by their correspondence with the beliefs of an authority figure . . . ” (King & Kitchener, 
1994, pp. 53-54).  For example, a teacher confronted with a playground conflict over ownership of 
some prized possession, may dogmatically re-assert the school rules about bringing such toys to 
school and confiscate the item. This evidences a solution that is based on a view of knowledge as 
absolute and categorical.  
 
However, when truth is considered to be not immediately obtainable, individuals may also rely on 
subjectivity or personal opinions. Such individuals still believe that some time in the future an 
absolute truth will be obtainable. Therefore such individuals hold a mixture of beliefs in right, wrong 
and uncertain knowledge  because some knowledge can now be temporarily unknown (King & 
Kitchener, 1985; Kitchener et al., 1993; King & Kitchener, 1994). Students’ justifications for 
solutions to ill-defined problems rely on personal opinion and authority (King & Kitchener, 1994). 
Pre-reflective thinking is similar to Perry's (1970, 1981) description of dualism and the beginning of 
multiplism.  
 
Quasi Reflective Thinking 
 
This type of thinking represents a significant change in thinking because individuals are now able to 
reflect on knowledge in an abstract way for the first time (Kitchener et al., 1993). Individuals are 
likely to believe that truth is uncertain and do not merely hold a temporary belief in such uncertainty. 
The dualistic categories of right and wrong still exist but not to the same extent as in pre reflective 
thinking  (King & Kitchener, 1985). People often support their beliefs by reflecting on idiosyncratic 
evidence and opinion (King & Kitchener, 1994). Using the previous example of the playground, a 
teacher may attempt to solve the problem by reflecting on similar experiences he or she had as a child.  
This would not necessarily involve any formal theories of child development but rather personal, 
subjective experiences of what might work in the particular situation. In this form of reflective 
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judgment, the teacher is not dogmatically referring to a set of rules to solve the problem, but an 
idiosyncratic justification. 
 
In quasi-reflective thinking, individuals may also begin to think relativistically using reasoned 
arguments not just subjective opinions: Individuals are able to evaluate arguments in single contexts 
(King & Kitchener, 1985) which is similar to Perry’s (1970, 1981) beginning stages of relativism. 
This type of thinking becomes evident across a range of contexts in the next stage.  
 
Reflective Thinking 
 
Reflective thinking is characterised by a belief that all knowledge is uncertain. Individuals are 
able to use reason and evidence to support opinion (Kitchener et al., 1993; King & Kitchener, 1994). 
Even though absolute, objective knowledge is not considered to exist, some personal viewpoints are 
more valid than others because they have been derived by using inquiry techniques that promote 
“relationships between sub-categories across domains” (King & Kitchener, 1985, p. 9). This stage is 
similar to Perry’s (1970, 1981) relativism because relativistic thinking now takes place in a range of 
contexts as a relational thinking activity. Relational thinking is evidenced by an ability to compare 
and contrast two perspectives of the same topic and develop an integrating structure that emerges 
from both perspectives (King & Kitchener, 1994). 
 
Individuals are likely to hold beliefs that “knowledge must be constructed through critical inquiry or 
through the synthesis of existing views and evidence into more cohesive and coherent explanations ... 
A judgment can be justified as the most reasonable current solution to a problem” (King & Kitchener, 
1985, p.10). In the example of the playground conflict, the teacher would help children to solve the 
conflict, recognising that there may be a number of solutions to the problem. The mediating process 
would also be informed by a range of informed theories of child development, not subjective opinions 
about what may or may not work. 
 
Multidimensional Epistemological Beliefs 
 
The schemes of development of epistemological beliefs described so far have been criticised for their 
stage-like, unidimensional characteristics. Building on the work of Perry and others, Schommer 
conceived of epistemological perspectives as more than a unidimensional set of beliefs that developed 
over time. Over a series of studies, she described a multidimensional set of, more or less, independent 
beliefs (Schommer 1990, 1993a, 1993b). This means that individuals may hold both sophisticated 
(more relativistic) and naïve (more dualistic) views about the nature of knowing. Schommer (1989, 
1990, 1993a, 1993b) described five dimensions of epistemological beliefs that included (a) 
Omniscient Authority (beliefs in the source of knowledge), (b) Certain Knowledge (beliefs in the 
certainty of knowledge), (c) Simple Knowledge (beliefs in structure of knowledge), (d) Quick 
Learning (beliefs in the speed of learning), and (e) Innate Ability (beliefs in the stability of 
knowledge) (Schommer, 1990).  
 
More recently, Schommer (1994) has conceptualised such beliefs as a kind of frequency distribution 
where ‘for example, sophisticated learners may believe a vast amount of knowledge is evolving, 
some knowledge is yet to be discovered, and a very small amount of knowledge is unchanging. . .  
On the other hand, naïve learners may believe a vast amount of information is certain, some 
knowledge is yet to be discovered, and a very small amount of knowledge is changing.’ (Schommer, 
1994, p.302).  This multiplicity of dimensions suggests "that epistemological beliefs do not 
necessarily develop in synchrony" (Schommer, 1994, p.302) and that learning may in fact be 
determined by individual as well as by a combination of beliefs. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
 
Epistemological beliefs have been described in terms of  (a) the influence on learning (Belenky et al., 
1986; Perry, 1970); (b) the influence on reasoning (King & Kitchener, 1994); and (c) 
multidimensional characteristics.  
 
The positions, stages, and dimensions of the various perspectives of epistemological beliefs are 
summarised in Table 1. Similarity between positions in each of the schemes is indicated by the 
placement of such positions at the same level in the table.  
 
Table 1: Summary of stages, positions, and dimensions in various perspectives of  
epistemological beliefs  
    
Perry (1970, 
1981, 1988) 
Belenky et al. 
(1986) 
King & Kitchener 
(1985, 1994) 
Schommer 
(1990, 1993a, 1993b) 
 
 
 
Dualism 
 
Multiplism 
 
Relativism 
 
Silenced 
 
Received Knowing 
 
Subjective Knowing 
 
Procedural Knowing 
 
 Constructed Knowing 
 
 
 
 
Pre reflective thinking 
 
Quasi reflective thinking 
 
Reflective thinking 
 
Naïve beliefs 
 
 
 
 
 
Sophisticated beliefs 
regarding 5 dimensions  
Omniscient Authority  
Certain Knowledge  
Simple Knowledge  
Quick Learning 
    Innate Ability 
 
 
In all of these schemes, epistemological beliefs are considered to develop from naïve to 
sophisticated. However, there is ongoing debate concerning the validity of sophisticated 
epistemological beliefs  (relativism, procedural and reflective thinking) as developmental ideals 
(Goldberger, 1996a). Goldberger  (1996a, 1996b) recognised that in certain cultures relativistic 
ways of knowing may not be appropriate, although she defended the superiority of such 
developmental ideals within the American context which reflects multiple perspectives of 
knowing. Similarly, it could be argued that there is a need to be aware of, and reflect upon, 
multiple perspectives in an increasingly pluralistic Australian society.  
 
It is likely that epistemological beliefs, which are considered to filter all knowledge and beliefs, 
influence beliefs about learning and teaching in specific learning situations and, therefore, how a 
person is likely to approach learning/teaching in particular contexts. This has implications for teacher 
educators who wish to help students to develop contstructivist beliefs. Constructivism is the belief that 
“individuals learn as they wrestle cognitively with problems of concern to them" (Shaver, 1992, p.17). 
It refers to a particular set of beliefs that understanding exists only for the individual who actively 
creates such beliefs. Regardless of whether knowledge is conceived of as individually or socially 
constructed, constructivism involves cognitive tasks that link new to prior knowledge, the 
individualisation of learning outcomes, and learning that is context-specific (Tynjala, 1997). Such 
constructivist beliefs are more likely to result in teaching behaviours that focus on facilitating 
meaningful learning in students (see Arredondo & Rucinski, 1996; Hasweh, 1996; Maor & Taylor, 
1995). 
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The epistemological beliefs literature has been reviewed with a focus on individuals’ beliefs about 
the nature and acquisition of knowledge (Bendixen et al., 1994). Although much of the research 
related to epistemological beliefs has provided perspectives on how beliefs about knowing may 
influence learning, there has been no framework that formalises such a relationship. The next 
section is a description of a framework for conceptualising epistemological beliefs holistically as 
both core beliefs about knowing and peripheral beliefs about learning. 
Epistemological Beliefs as Core Beliefs About Knowing And Peripheral Beliefs About Learning  
 
A beliefs structure comprises both core (values) and peripheral beliefs. The more a belief is 
connected with others within the system (core), the more central and impervious it is to change 
(Bem, 1970; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Pajares, 1992; Howard, 1987 cited in Peterman, 1991; 
Rokeach, 1968). Peripheral beliefs are more able to be reflected upon and changed (Howard, 1987 
cited in Peterman, 1991) because other knowledge and beliefs are not dependent on them.  
 
 In Rokeach’s (1968) seminal work, five types of beliefs were described as existing along a continuum 
from core to more peripheral in nature. These are Types A, B, C, D, and E: Type A and B beliefs are 
more central, while Type E beliefs are peripheral.  
 
Type A beliefs concern those that are fundamental to our psychological existence. They are described 
as a set of existential, shared, often non-conscious beliefs related to the credibility of one’s own 
senses (e.g., How do I know that my senses are not deceiving me as a way of knowing?) or an 
external authority as sources of knowledge (Bem, 1970). These represent a basic set of core values, 
which are epistemological in nature. Bem suggested that we may not even be aware that alternatives 
could even exist, for example that our senses may not be a reliable way of knowing.  
 
According to Rokeach, a person’s Type B beliefs include those that are primitive in nature but are not 
necessarily shared by other people. These include such things as phobias, delusions and ego-related 
beliefs. 
 
Type C beliefs are similar to Type A beliefs in authorities (external or self) but are not primitive 
because they are more likely to be consciously reflected upon.  
Such beliefs, while important and generally resistant to change, are nevertheless conjectured to 
be less important and easier to change than Types A and B beliefs. . . Such beliefs concern not 
only which authorities could know but also which authorities would know. Which authorities, 
positive and negative, are we to trust and distrust, to look to and not to look to, as we go about 
our daily lives seeking information about our world? . . . any given authority belief is typically 
controvertible because the believer has learned that some of his reference persons and groups 
do not share his belief” (Rokeach, 1968, p. 10).  
 
Type C beliefs are the product of explicit reflection and emerge from a logical, explicit awareness of 
the fallibility of external sources and our sensory experiences.  
 
The next set of beliefs along the core-peripheral continuum is Type D, which are those that are 
derived from an authority. “Believing in the credibility of a particular authority implies an acceptance 
of other beliefs perceived to emanate from such authority.” (Rokeach, 1968, p.10). For example, 
Marton and Säljö  (1976) described some conceptions of learning as emerging from a process of 
making meaning in which individuals actively construct personal knowledge. According to Rokeach, 
such derived beliefs about learning might emanate from a core belief in the self as an authority and 
could be described as peripheral beliefs about learning.   
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Finally, inconsequential or Type E beliefs are related to an individual’s personal taste (e.g., an 
individual’s favourite colour) and therefore are less functionally related to other beliefs. If these were 
altered there would be no implications for beliefs related to self (Rokeach, 1968). 
 
Using the structure suggested by Rokeach (1968), epistemological beliefs will now be defined in this 
paper as core beliefs about knowing and peripheral beliefs about learning. Core beliefs about knowing 
may be considered to be central or functionally connected to all other beliefs and knowledge and can 
be described as Type A or C beliefs in the credibility of an authority: Peripheral beliefs about learning 
would be derived from a core belief about knowing and be described as Type D. Hofer and Pintrich 
(1997) also believed that core beliefs about knowing are central values (as described by Rokeach, 
1968) that are functionally connected to, and therefore influence the development of, most other 
beliefs and knowledge. They suggested that views about the nature of knowledge (certainty and 
simplicity of knowledge) and knowing (source of knowledge and justification for knowing) “. . 
.should be considered the core of an individual’s theory, while the other beliefs about learning, 
teaching and intelligence may be related to the core dimensions but are peripheral to an individual’s 
theory. . .” (p. 119). In this context “an individual’s theory” is considered to reflect their belief system 
in relation to knowledge. Hofer and Pintrich argued further that beliefs about learning should not 
feature in descriptions of epistemological beliefs in general. They believed that such beliefs do not 
constitute the core dimensions of epistemological theories and have labelled them as ‘peripheral 
beliefs about learning, instruction and intelligence’ (p. 113). They postulated that core beliefs about 
knowing should include only those beliefs about ‘the nature of knowledge and the nature or process of 
knowing’ (p. 112). According to this revised definition of epistemological beliefs, the schemes 
described by Perry,  Belenky et al., and King and Kitchener as well as three of Schommer’s 
dimensions (Omniscient Authority, Certain Knowledge, and Simple Knowledge) would comprise 
core beliefs about knowing. Schommer's other two dimensions, Quick Learning and Innate Ability, 
would be considered to be peripheral beliefs about learning and intelligence.  
 
Core Beliefs about Knowing: Context specific or generalisable?  
 
The notion of core beliefs about knowing as central values implies that they may be generalised 
across disciplines. For example, Schommer and Walker (1995) noted in their study of college students 
that core beliefs about knowing were similar across the disciplines of maths and social science. King 
and Kitchener’s (1994) research also showed that individuals’ core beliefs about knowing are 
consistent across a range of disciplines.  
 
Mori's (1999) recent study supported Schommer and Walkers' view that core beliefs about knowing 
are generalisable, although his earlier work presented a different view in this regard. In his 1997 
study, Mori suggested that core beliefs about knowing were context specific rather than being similar 
across domains. Sheese and Radovanovic (1984), Beers (1988), and Roth and Roychoudhury (1994) 
similarly reported that core beliefs about knowing are more likely to be context specific. 
 
A third perspective in this debate must also be considered. Ruddick (1996) claimed that core 
beliefs about knowing can be described as both generalised and context specific. She postulated 
that people have different beliefs about knowing in different contexts and yet conceded that 
‘prolonged focus on any of these kinds of inquiries may well produce cognitive capacities and 
attitudes that recur to different degrees in epistemologically dissimilar contexts’ (pp. 254-255). 
This means that, while core beliefs about knowing may be context specific, it is also possible that 
they may be held across a range of contexts, giving the impression that they are generalisable. The 
debate regarding context-specific versus generalised beliefs about knowing is ongoing and in need 
of further discussion (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).  
 
To summarise, a substantial body of research now recognizes the relationship between knowing and 
learning. In particular, he notions of centrality and unavailability of core beliefs about knowing raised 
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earlier in the paper are important when considering belief change in teacher education. To facilitate 
the development of more sophisticated core beliefs, it may be necessary to help students reflect 
explicitly on these in order to develop higher order beliefs that are then more controvertible (Rokeach, 
1968). Also, the centrality of core beliefs about knowing has implications for how teacher educators 
conceive of teacher education programs. If teacher educators wish to help student teachers become 
more cognitively sophisticated, and able to attend to multiple viewpoints within a broader social, 
cultural and political context (cf. Hatton & Smith, 1995), then it may be necessary to focus on 
developing more sophisticated core beliefs about knowing. These beliefs may then influence or filter 
the peripheral or derived (Type D) beliefs about learning. The next section of this paper will 
investigate the student learning literature in the light of the epistemological beliefs literature. 
 
 
 
The Student Learning Research 
 
This section of the review is a description of conceptions of learning and how they might fit 
within the overall epistemological beliefs system. In order to do this, however, conceptions and 
beliefs need to be clarified. Using the core-peripheral framework, beliefs about learning may be 
described as peripheral or Type D within the epistemological beliefs system. This means that 
beliefs related to learning are derived from core beliefs about knowing and are more open to 
change. 
 
The framework presented in this paper is based on an understanding that beliefs are a subset of 
knowledge (Schoenfeld, 1985). In a similar way, Alexander and Dochy (1995) believed that 
knowledge included everything an individual knows or believes to be true despite whether or not there 
is evidence to support it.  
 
Pajares (1992) described how beliefs can be distinguished from knowledge on the basis of evaluative, 
affective and behavioural characteristics. In order to consider how conceptions of learning might 
relate to beliefs about learning, the conception of learning as memorising (see Marton et al., 1993) 
will be used as an example. First, the success of rote learning (memorising) at school may lead to a 
judgment or an evaluation that this particular type of learning is valuable. Second, such a conception 
of learning may also have related affective qualities. For example, if an individual has experienced 
success with memorisation in the past, these experiences may have provided the individual with 
strong positive feelings that become associated with such a conception. These affective characteristics 
are then likely to influence learning behaviour because an individual will often expend more energy 
and time on learning activities that are associated with positive experiences. Conceptions of learning 
may be similar to beliefs about learning if individuals evaluate the nature of the particular conception 
of learning, develop strong feelings regarding such conceptions, and then behave in a way that reflects 
those understandings. 
 
Säljö (1979) identified five different conceptions of learning which included learning as (a) an 
increase in knowledge, (b) memorising, (c) the acquisition of knowledge for retention or use in 
practice, (d) understanding, and (e) an interpretative process aimed at the understanding of reality.  
Marton et al. (1993) also found that Social Science students at the Open University in Britain held 
similar conceptions to those described by Säljö (1979) except for a sixth conception. These 
conceptions included (a) Increasing one's knowledge, (b) Memorising and reproducing, (c) 
Applying, (d) Understanding, (e) Seeing something in a different way, and (f) Changing as a 
person.  
 
The first three conceptions of learning represented in the hierarchy described by Säljö (1979) and by 
Marton et al. (1993) are (a) increasing knowledge, (b) memorisation and (c) acquisition of knowledge 
for retention or use in practice. Common to these three conceptions is the notion that learning involves 
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the acquisition of aggregation of knowledge without any transformation of the information to develop 
understanding. These are quantitative in nature because students perceive that they need to acquire a 
range of facts that remain unconnected. There is evidence to suggest that such conceptions could be 
the result of previous educational experiences, particularly experiences with formal examinations 
(Säljö, 1984). Van Rossum and Schenk (1984) reported that a considerable number of first year 
university students held quantitative beliefs about learning, possibly because of their educational 
experiences prior to tertiary studies. However, this is not surprising considering the research that 
suggests that first year college students are also likely to possess predominantly dualistic or 
multiplistic core beliefs about knowing (see, for example, Baxter Magolda, 1993b).  
 
The final conceptions in the hierarchy are described by Säljö (1979) as (d) understanding and (e) an 
interpretative process aimed at the understanding of reality and Marton et al. (1993) as  (d) 
understanding, (e) seeing something in a different way, and (f) changing as a person. These 
conceptions involve a view of learning as a process of active, personal construction of meaning and 
change. They are qualitative in nature because understanding emerges from a transformation of the 
information in relation to the learners' prior knowledge rather than a focus on aggregating quantities 
of information that remain unconnected. Similar qualitative views of learning were also described by 
Van Rossum and Schenk (1984).   
 
There are two fundamental differences between the quantitative and qualitative conceptions 
described by Säljö (1979) and Marton et al. (1993). The first involves how knowledge can be 
gained (Wilkinson, 1989). In the quantitative conceptions the learner believes that learning is 
acquiring external knowledge from an external source without active construction of knowledge.  
This view of learning is similar to the naïve core beliefs about knowing described by Perry (1970), 
Belenky et al. (1986), and Baxter Magolda (1993a) where knowledge is also absorbed from an 
external source without personal construction of meaning. The qualitative conceptions (d), (e) and 
(f) involve learning as a process of active knowledge construction by the individual to extract 
meaning from the learning task. It is possible that individuals with such sophisticated conceptions 
acknowledge that quantitative perspectives may also play a role in learning, although the overall 
focus is on qualitative perspectives of learning. Both qualitative conceptions of learning and the 
more sophisticated, core beliefs about knowing described by Perry, Belenky et al., and King and 
Kitchener are characterised by the perspective that knowledge is a construction of meaning. 
Considering the filtering role of core beliefs about knowing, it is possible that dualistic core 
beliefs will promote quantitative conceptions of learning, while relativistic core beliefs may 
influence the development of qualitative conceptions of learning. 
 
The second difference between qualitative and quantitative beliefs or conceptions relates to the 
nature of what is learnt (Wilkinson, 1989). Individuals with quantitative conceptions of learning, 
according to Marton et al. (1993), view knowledge as discrete elements existing out there that can 
be acquired without transformation. The qualitative conceptions reflect views that knowledge is 
complex (not discrete but interconnected) and relative to the individual’s interaction with a 
particular context (not absolute) and may reflect the dualistic-relativistic perspectives of knowing 
described by Perry (1970), Belenky et al. (1986), and Baxter Magolda (1993a). Table 2 is an 
overview of the literature that has been reviewed to construct an holistic conceptualisation of 
epistemological beliefs from a core-periphery beliefs perspective. 
 
 
Teaching Implications 
 
  The literature regarding core and peripheral beliefs was reviewed to provide a useful 
framework for the implementation of teaching programs aimed at developing students’ 
epistemological beliefs. Core beliefs about knowing may influence peripheral beliefs about 
learning (Bem, 1970; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Rokeach, 1968). However, students’ conceptions of 
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learning in a specific situation may be dependent on both the way in which they have experienced 
learning in the past and the way in which they experience the current situation. For example, 
qualitative beliefs about learning and subsequent approaches to learning are likely to be the 
product of both sophisticated core beliefs about knowing and learning environments that promote 
sophisticated beliefs about learning (e.g., assessment that encourages students to actively engage 
in the learning tasks, collaborative learning groups, stress-free learning etc.). This means there are 
two main implications for teacher education. First, interventions may need to focus on helping 
students reflect explicitly on their core beliefs about knowing and peripheral beliefs about 
learning. Second, the learning context, in particular the assessment procedures, needs to be 
structured to encourage students to develop more sophisticated epistemological beliefs. Each of 
these implications for teaching will be discussed in turn.  
 
Explicit Reflections on Epistemological Beliefs  
 
To promote the development of relativistic core beliefs about knowing and qualitative conceptions of 
learning it may be important to challenge students to reflect on these with a view to possibly 
reconstructing such beliefs. Such beliefs are usually well developed by the time student teachers 
commence a teacher education course (Calderhead & Robson, 1991; Wilson, 1990). It is possible that 
teacher education students may be able to engage in further study without having to rethink their own 
beliefs. This may occur because throughout their personal school experiences they have developed 
beliefs about knowing, learning and teaching that have influenced their perceptions of appropriate 
teaching practice (Pajares, 1992). 
 
The more a belief is connected with other beliefs, the more central the belief and the more impervious 
it is to change (Rokeach, 1968). Therefore, core beliefs about knowing may be difficult to change.  
However, explicit reflection on these may facilitate the development of higher order beliefs, which are 
then typically more easily changed. Such meta-metacognitive awareness, or awareness of one’s 
epistemological beliefs, is also considered to be an essential teaching characteristic needed for dealing 
with ill-defined problems so typical of everyday interactions in school environments (Kitchener, 
1983). 
 
The Learning Context 
 
It may not be sufficient to help students to reflect on their epistemological beliefs. The learning 
context may also need to be changed so that students are required to engage in constructivist learning 
behaviours that may then influence their epistemological beliefs (cf. Unger, Draper & Pendergrass, 
1986). In particular, assessment is a key factor in determining  students’ learning behaviour and 
beliefs about learning in particular contexts. Biggs (1996b) described constructivist alignment of 
teaching objectives and assessment procedures as a way to help students engage in meaningful 
learning. If relativistic epistemological beliefs and related teaching objectives are aligned with 
assessment approaches that complement these beliefs, then alignment is likely to have a backwash 
effect and result in meaningful approaches to learning (Biggs, 1996b). Such assessment needs to focus 
on the development of understanding and the application of theory to personal situations and 
experiences rather than a reproductive focus on gaining facts (cf. Biggs, 1996a). Constructivist 
alignment of assessment and objectives may help those students with more naïve epistemological 
beliefs to engage in meaningful learning to fulfil assessment requirements. This change in behaviour 
may, over time, facilitate belief change (Unger, Draper & Pendergrass, 1986).  
BELIEFS ABOUT KNOWING AND LEARNING – BROWNLEE ET AL 12 
 
Table 2: Overview of literature used to construct an holistic conceptualisation of epistemological beliefs 
 
Hofer & 
Pintrich (1997) 
Rokeach 
(1968) 
Perry (1970, 
1988) 
Belenky et al. 
(1986) 
King & 
Kitchener 
(1985, 1994) 
Schommer 
(1990, 1993a, 1993b) 
Säljö (1979) Marton et al. 
(1993) 
Type A  
beliefs 
(existential, 
shared, 
nonconscious 
beliefs about 
credibility of 
senses or external 
source as way of 
knowing) 
 
Non Conscious 
Beliefs  
Dualism 
Multiplism 
Relativism 
Non Conscious 
Beliefs 
 Received 
Subjective  
Procedural 
Constructed 
Non conscious 
beliefs 
Pre reflective  
Quasi reflective  
Reflective 
Non conscious beliefs  
 
Naïve 
 
Sophisticated 
 
(regarding 3 dimensions 
Omniscient Authority Certain 
Knowledge Simple 
Knowledge) 
  Core beliefs 
(about the 
nature of 
knowledge & 
knowing) 
 
Type C 
beliefs 
(similar to 
Type A 
beliefs but 
consciously 
held) 
Conscious  
Beliefs 
Dualism 
Multiplism 
Relativism 
Conscious 
 Beliefs  
Received 
Subjective  
Procedural 
Constructed 
Conscious 
 beliefs  
Pre reflective  
Quasi reflective  
Reflective 
Conscious 
 Beliefs 
Naïve 
 
Sophisticated 
 
(regarding 3 dimensions 
Omniscient Authority Certain 
Knowledge Simple 
Knowledge) 
 
Peripheral 
Beliefs  
(about 
learning, 
instruction & 
intelligence) 
Type D 
beliefs 
(beliefs 
derived from 
authority) 
 
 
 
 
   Conscious beliefs 
Naïve 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sophisticated 
 
(regarding 2 dimensions 
Quick Learning 
Innate Ability) 
(a) an increase in 
knowledge 
(b) memorising 
 
(c) the acquisition of 
knowledge for retention 
or use in practice 
(d) understanding 
(e) an interpretative 
process aimed at the 
understanding of reality  
 
(a) increasing  
knowledge 
(b) memorising & 
reproducing 
(c) applying 
 
 
(d) understanding 
(e) seeing something in 
a different way 
 
(f) Changing as a 
person.  
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Conclusion   
 
 The literature related to epistemological beliefs has been reviewed to provide a meaningful 
construction of the developmental epistemological beliefs and student learning research literature. 
This construction has been developed by using a core-peripheral beliefs framework to integrate 
the two distinct literatures. The framework may provide a platform for future studies that are 
focussed on investigating effective learning and teaching in teacher education. Teacher educators 
need to recognise the importance of helping students to reflect on their epistemological beliefs in 
order to facilitate the development of more sophisticated beliefs. However, teacher educators also 
need to be aware of how the environment, particularly learning activities and assessment, needs to 
be structured to ensure that constructivist learning behaviours occur. Such behaviour change may 
then also lead to changes in students’ epistemological beliefs.  
BELIEFS ABOUT KNOWING AND LEARNING - BROWNLEE ET AL 
 
14 
 
 
References 
 
Alexander, P. A., & Dochy, F. (1995). Conceptions of knowledge and beliefs: A comparison across varying 
cultural and educational communities. American Educational Research Journal, 32, 2, 413-442. 
 
Baxter Magolda, M. B. (1988, April). The impact of the freshman year on epistemological development: 
Gender differences. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research 
Association, New Orleans, LA. 
 
Baxter Magolda, M. B. (1993b, November). The development of contextual knowing in graduate and 
professional education settings. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for the 
Study of Higher Education (8th), Pittsburgh,. 
 
Baxter Magolda, M. B. (1994). Post-college experiences and epistemology. The Review of Higher Education, 
18, 1, 25-44. 
 
Beers, S. E. (1984, March). An analysis of the interaction between students' epistemological assumptions and 
the composing process. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Conference on College 
Composition and Communication, 35th, New York City. 
 
Belenky, M. F., Clinchy, B. M., Goldberger, N. R., & Tarule, J. M. (1986). Women’s ways of knowing: The 
development of self, voice and mind. USA: Basic Books. 
 
Bem, D. J. (1970). Beliefs, attitudes, and human affairs. California: Brooks/Cole. 
 
Bendixen, L. D., Dunkle, M. E., & Schraw, G. (1994). Epistemological beliefs and reflective judgment. 
Psychological Reports, 75, 1595-1600. 
 
Calderhead, N., & Robson, M. (1991). Images of teaching: Student teachers' early conceptions of classroom 
practice. Teaching and Teacher Education, 1, 1-8. 
 
Debold, E., Tolman, D., & Brown, L. (1996). Embodying knowledge, knowing desire: Authority and split 
subjectivities in girl's epistemological development. In N. Goldberger, J. Tarule, B. Clinchy, & M. 
Belenky (Eds.), Knowledge, difference and power (pp. 85-125). New York: Basic Books. 
 
Goldberger, N. (1996a). Looking backward, looking forward. In N. Goldberger, J. Tarule, B. Clinchy, & M. 
Belenky (Eds.), Knowledge, difference and power (pp. 1-17). New York: Basic Books. 
 
 Goldberger, N. R. (1996b). Cultural imperatives and diversity in ways of knowing. In N. Goldberger, J. 
Tarule, B. Clinchy, & M. Belenky (Eds.), Knowledge, difference and power (pp. 335-371). New 
York: Basic Books. 
     
 Hatton, N., & Smith, D. (1995). Facilitating reflection: Issues and research. Forum of Education, 50, 1, 49. 
(65) 
          
Hofer, B., & Pintrich, P. R. (1997). The development of epistemological theories: Beliefs about knowledge 
and knowing and their relation to learning. Review of Educational Research, 67, 1, 88. (144) 
 
King, P. M., & Kitchener, K. S. (1994). Developing reflective judgment: Understanding and promoting 
intellectual growth and critical thinking in adolescents and adults. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Maher, F., & Tetreault, M. (1996). Women's ways of knowing in women's studies, feminist pedagogies and 
feminist theory. In N. Goldberger, J. Tarule, B. Clinchy, & M. Belenky (Eds.), Knowledge, difference 
and power (pp. 148-174). New York: Basic Books. 
 
BELIEFS ABOUT KNOWING AND LEARNING - BROWNLEE ET AL 
 
15 
 
Mahoney, M. (1996). Connected knowledge in constructive psychotherapy. In N. Goldberger, J. Tarule, B. 
Clinchy, & M. Belenky (Eds.), Knowledge, difference and power (pp. 126-147). New York: Basic 
Books. 
 
Marton, F., Dall'Alba, G., & Beaty, E. (1993). Conceptions of Learning. International Journal of Educational 
Research, 46, 4-11. 
 
Marton, F., & Saljo, R. (1976). On qualitative differences in learning: Outcome and process. British Journal 
of Educational Psychology, 46, 4-11. 
 
Marton, F., Watkins, D., & Tang, T. K. W. (1995, August). Discontinuities and continuities in the experience 
of learning: An interview study of high-school students in Hong Kong. Paper presented at the 6th 
European Conference for Research on Learning and Instruction, Nijmegen, Netherlands. 
 
Mori, Y. (1997, March). Epistemological beliefs and language learning: What do language learners believe 
about their learning? Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research 
Association, Chicago IL. 
 
Mori, Y. (1999). Epistemological beliefs and language learning beliefs: What do language learners believe 
about their learning? Language Learning, 49, 3, 377-415. 
 
Nisbett, R., & Ross, L. (1980). Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of social judgment. Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
 
Pajares, M. F. (1992). Teacher's beliefs and educational research: Cleaning up a messy construct. Review of 
Educational Research, 62, 3, 307-332. 
 
Perry, W. G. J. (1970). Forms of intellectual and ethical development in the college years: A scheme. New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
 
Perry, W. G. J. (1981). Cognitive and ethical growth: The making of meaning. In A. W. Chickering (Ed.), The 
Modern American College (pp. 76-116). San Francisco: Jossey-Boss. 
 
Perry, W. G. (1988). Different worlds in the same classroom. In Improving learning: New perspectives (pp. 
145-161). London: Kogan Page. 
 
Peterman, F. P. (1991, April). An experienced teacher's emerging constructivist beliefs about teaching and 
learning. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, 
Chicago, IL. 
 
Posner, G., Strike, K., Hewson, P., & Gertzog, W. (1982). Accommodation of a scientific conception: Toward 
a theory of conceptual change. Science Education, 66, 2, 211-227. 
 
Rokeach, M. (1968). Beliefs, attitudes and values. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc. 
 
Roth, W. M., & Roychoudhury, A. (1994). Physics students epistemologies and views about knowing and 
learning. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 31, 1, 5-30. 
 
Ruddick, S. (1996). Reason's "feminity": A case for connected knowing. In N. Goldberger, J. Tarule, B. 
Clinchy, & M. Belenky (Eds.), Knowledge, difference and power (pp. 248-273). New York: Basic 
Books. 
 
Saljo, R. (1979). Learning in the learner's perspective: Some common sense conceptions. Report from the 
Institute of Education University of Gothenberg, No 76. 
 
BELIEFS ABOUT KNOWING AND LEARNING - BROWNLEE ET AL 
 
16 
 
Schoenfeld, A. H. (1985). Mathematical problem solving. Orlando, FL: Academic Press. 
 
Schommer, M. A. (1989). Students' beliefs about the nature of knowledge: What are they and how do they 
affect comprehension? Technical Report No. 484. Bolt, Beranek and Newman, Inc., Cambridge, 
Mass.; Illinois University, Urbana, Center for the Study of Reading. 
 
Schommer, M. A. (1990). Effects of beliefs about the nature of knowledge on comprehension. Journal of 
Educational Psychology, 82, 3, 498-504. 
 
Schommer, M. A. (1993a). Comparisons of beliefs about the nature of knowledge and learning among 
postsecondary students. Research in Higher Education, 34, 3, 355-370. 
 
Schommer, M. A. (1993b). Epistemological development and academic performance among secondary 
schools. Journal of Educational Psychology, 85, 3, 406-411. 
 
Schommer, M. A. (1998). The role of adults' beliefs about knowledge in school, work, and everyday life. In 
M. C. Smith & T. Pourchot (Eds.), Adult learning and development (pp. 127-144). New Jersey: 
Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 
Schommer, M. A., & Walker, K. (1995). Are epistemological beliefs similar across domains? Journal of 
Educational Psychology, 87, 3, 424-432. 
 
Sheese, R., & Radovanovic, H. (1984, June). W.G. Perry's model of intellectual and ethical development: 
Implications of recent research for education and counseling of young adults. Paper presented at the 
Annual Meeting of the Canadian Psychological Association, Ottawa, Ontario. 
 
Sutton, R. E., Cafarelli, A., Lund, R., Schurdell, D., & Bischel, S. (1996). A developmental constructivist 
approach to pre-service teachers' ways of knowing. Teaching and Teacher Education, 12, 4, 413-427. 
 
Van Rossum, E. J., & Schenk, S. M. (1984). The relationship between learning conceptions, study strategy 
and learning outcome. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 54, 78-83. 
 
Wilkinson, W. K. (1989). A contrast of Perry and Royce: Implications for the study of college students' 
epistemological orientations. The Canadian Journal of Higher Education, 14, 2, 87-96. 
 
Wilson, S. M. (1990). The secret garden of teacher education. Phi Delta Kappan, 72, 204-209. 
 
